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Abstract  
 
Injustice experiences are likely to have a strong impact on adolescents’ life. However, individuals 
differ in how they perceive and respond to injustice depending on their justice sensitivity. Whereas 
several studies analyzed the relationships between justice sensitivity and antisocial behaviors in 
adult samples, little is known about this relationship among adolescents. The aim of the present ex-
perimental study is to expand knowledge on the antecedents and effects of justice sensitivity from 
the Victim (i.e., JS-Victim) and Others (i.e., JS-Observer, Perpetrator, and Beneficiary) perspective, 
particularly with regard to its relationship to willingness to act in dishonest behavioral intentions 
(e.g., stealing money or objects from classmates, teachers, or strangers). The study involved 369 
Italian students (52% males; Mage = 16.64, SD = 1.78). We examined the role of justice sensitivity in 
the relationship between the recall of unfair, fair, or neutral episodes, and the consequent willing-
ness to perform dishonest behaviors. Results demonstrate that recalling unfair (vs. fair or neutral) 
episodes lead to an increase in JS-Others, which in turn decreased willingness to behave dishonest-
ly. Conversely, JS-Victim did not mediate the relationship between the recall of unfair episodes and 
intentions to behave dishonestly. The present findings suggest that during adolescence JS-Others 
might act as a protective factor against dishonest behaviors.  
 
Keywords: injustice-related experiences, justice sensitivity, dishonest behavioral intentions, 
adolescent.   
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Being treated in an unfair way has important implications on individuals’ emotions, atti-
tudes, and behaviors (e.g., Lupfer, Weeks, Doan, & Houston, 2000; Rousseau, Salek, Aubè, & Mo-
rin, 2009). Research has shown that the experience of being treated unfairly negatively affects peo-
ple’s self-esteem (Horton, 2004), as well as social relationships (Tyler, 1990). However, not every-
one is equally sensitive to unjust treatments. Individual differences in justice sensitivity, that is, a 
personal concern for justice, play a crucial role in how people react when experiencing unjust 
events (Baumert, Thomas, & Schmitt, 2012; Schmitt, Neumann, & Montada, 1995). A study by 
Baumert and Schmitt (2009) showed that, after situational cues of injustice were made salient, indi-
vidual differences in justice sensitivity influenced how just an ambiguous situation was perceived to 
be (with people high in justice sensitivity perceiving it as less just). Moreover, researchers have 
shown that the higher the individual’s justice sensitivity, the stronger their tendency to perceive un-
just episodes as such and to show intense emotional reactions to injustice (Schmitt et al., 1995). In 
addition, the higher the justice sensitivity the more people respond to injustice by protesting 
(Mohiyeddini & Schmitt, 1997; Schmitt & Mohiyeddini, 1996), or by punishing offenders, even at 
the cost of personal disadvantage (Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004). 
Although studies have highlighted the crucial role of justice sensitivity in how people re-
spond to unjust or unethical behavior, research has yet to systematically investigate the situational 
antecedents of sensitivity to justice. Instead, justice sensitivity has been approached as a relatively 
stable individual trait (Schmitt et al., 1995) and the potential for it to be influenced by situational 
factors has been overlooked. Indeed, latent state-trait models have accounted only partially for the 
variance in justice judgements (Baumert et al., 2014; Bondü & Elsner, 2015; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, 
Maes, & Arbach, 2005), while other studies have directly suggested that justice sensitivity can be 
also “state-like” and can, for example, be affected by previous justice-related experiences. For ex-
ample, Wijn and van den Bos (2010) found that exposure to both just and unjust events, as com-
pared to neutral events, increases (state) justice sensitivity. Similarly, Kastenmüller, Greitemeyer, 
Hindocha, Tattersall, and Fischer (2013) showed that death-related (vs. neutral) pictures (Study 1), 
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or that reading bogus newspaper articles about the high (vs. low) likelihood of terrorism (Study 2), 
led to higher scores on a justice sensitivity measure. 
As justice sensitivity has been primarily studied in adult samples, little is known with regard 
to the plasticity of justice sensitivity, or the link between justice sensitivity and dishonest behavior 
in adolescents’ samples. Thus, the aim of the present research was to examine, for the first time, 
how recalling events involving (un)fair treatment might affect adolescents’ willingness to behave 
dishonestly (such as theft of classmates’, teachers’ and strangers’ money or objects), and to consid-
er changes in justice sensitivity as a potential mediating mechanism for this relation.  
Our interest in relating the salience of (un)fairness to the willingness to act dishonest behav-
iors stems from the fact that (dis)honesty is a core element of moral action (Moore & Gino, 2013). 
Since moral action can be seen as an indicator of the extent to which one feels valued and values 
others in their surrounding (Aquino & Reed, 2002), one can expect it to vary depending on whether 
one’s attention is focused on injustices that happened to the self or to others. Adolescence should be 
no different from adulthood in this regard—if anything, these processes might be particularly sali-
ent among adolescents, given the importance of social relationships in this period. Moreover, un-
derstanding what factors might affect (dis)honesty in adolescence seems particularly important, 
given that this is a crucial period in the development of moral values (Prestch et al., 2016). During 
adolescence, many cognitive abilities (Hoffman, 2000) and prerequisites of moral reasoning, such 
as perspective taking and empathy (Van der Graaff et al., 2014) gain in complexity and differentia-
tion (Chaparro, Kim, Fernández, & Malti, 2013; Van der Graff et al., 2014). At the same time, mor-
al principles and justice beliefs become increasingly important for self-definition (Bondü & Elsner, 
2015). 
Different Facets of Justice Sensitivity and Behavioral Outcomes 
Justice Sensitivity is a multidimensional construct (Bondü & Krahé, 2015), as people expe-
rience and respond to justice-related situations from difference perspectives (Baumert et al., 2012; 
Mikula, 1994). Depending on the viewpoint from which the event is experienced, four different per-
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spectives of justice sensitivity can be distinguished (Baumert & Schmitt, 2016). People can: (1) be 
vigilant to be treated unfairly by others: This is typically associated with anger and a need for re-
venge (i.e., victim justice sensitivity); (2) be inclined to perceive unfair behaviors against others 
without being directly involved in that unfair interaction/situation: This is typically associated with 
resentment and a need to punish the perpetrator or compensate the victim) (i.e., observer justice 
sensitivity); (3) be inclined to punish themselves for their own unjust behaviors: Typical reaction is 
guilt and the need to compensate the victim (i.e., perpetrator justice sensitivity); or (4) experience 
situations in which they obtain outcomes to their own advantage and to the disadvantage of others 
as aversive (i.e., beneficiary justice sensitivity; Bondü & Elsner, 2015; Schmitt et al., 2005; Schmitt, 
Baumert, Gollwitzer, & Maes, 2010).  
Although all four justice sensitivity perspectives reflect a general concern for justice 
(Baumert et al., 2014), it is possible to distinguish two main macro-perspectives among them. Spe-
cifically, while on the one hand victim sensitivity embraces a self-focused justice concern, observer, 
beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivity involve a genuine concern for others and reflect an other-
focused justice concern (Baumert et al., 2012). For this reason, measurement tools assessing justice 
sensitivity often combine scores from observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivity scales into a 
single index (i.e., JS-Others), to be contrasted with the index of victim sensitivity (i.e., JS-Victim; 
Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; Lotz, Schlösser, Cain, & Fetchenhauer, 2013; Stavrova, Schlösser, & 
Baumert, 2014).  
Interestingly, research conducted with adult samples has shown that JS-Victim and JS-
Others are differently associated with attitudes and behavioral outcomes. JS-Victim generally pre-
dict negative emotions and reactions, such as anger, resentment (Faccenda, Pantaleon, & Reynes, 
2009; Mohiyeddini & Schmitt, 1997) and proactive aggression (Bondü & Richter, 2016), and it is 
positively related to hostility, jealously, revenge, or negative reciprocity (Baumert et al., 2014; 
Schmitt et al., 2005). JS-Others, instead, rooted in an altruistic concern for justice (Schmitt et al., 
2005), is positively related to prosocial dispositions, empathy, role taking and social responsibility 
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(Dar & Resh, 2001; Schmitt et al., 2005). Schmitt (1998), for example, showed that for people liv-
ing in Western Germany, JS-Victim was negatively related to willingness to pay extra taxes to help 
the Eastern and poorer part of the country. In contrast, JS-Others positively predicted Western Ger-
mans’ helping attitudes. Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, and Baer (2005) found that while JS-
Victim was associated with willingness to transgress norms in tempting situations, JS-Others was 
linked to norm compliance (Study 3). A subsequent study showed that when participants were 
asked to predict the cooperativeness of different targets on the basis of minimal information, the ac-
curacy of predictions was negatively related to victim sensitivity, in that the higher the victim sensi-
tivity the lower the estimate of targets’ cooperativeness (Gollwitzer, Rothmund, Alt, & Jeckel, 
2012, Study 2). Similarly, by adopting a social dilemma paradigm and manipulating information on 
how many players violated a fairness rule in previous rounds of the game, Gollwitzer, Rothmund, 
Pfeiffer, and Esenbach (2009) showed that the higher the victim sensitivity, the stronger the will-
ingness to behave uncooperatively, even when there were slight indicators of untrustworthiness. By 
contrast, the higher the JS-Others, the stronger the tendency to behave cooperatively even after hav-
ing been confronted with strong cues of untrustworthiness.  Likewise, in a study investigating deci-
sions in social dilemmas such as dictator games, ultimatum games, and mixed motive games, 
Fetchenauer and Huang (2004) found that the higher respondents scored on JS-Others, the more 
their game decisions followed norms of equality, whereas participants with high victim sensitivity 
showed the opposite pattern.  
As justice sensitivity has been primarily studied in adult samples, little is known with regard 
to the plasticity of justice sensitivity, or the link between justice sensitivity and dishonest behavior 
in adolescents’ samples. As partial exceptions, recent correlational findings indicate that, on one 
hand, mean scores of JS-Victim seem to rise in late adolescence while JS-Others continues to in-
crease into young adulthood (Bondü & Elsner, 2015) and, on the other, that antisocial behaviors 
(such as physical and relational aggression) are positively related with JS-Victim, and negatively 
with JS-Perpetrator –i.e., a facet of JS-Others (Bondü & Krahè, 2015).  
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The Current Study 
In the present study, we were interested in examining the plasticity of adolescents’ scores on 
two different facets of justice sensitivity – JS-Victim and JS-Others – as a function of their recall of 
autobiographical experiences that involved receiving unfair (versus fair or neutral) treatments. In 
addition, our study aimed to establish how recalling unfair experiences influenced adolescents’ sub-
sequent willingness to behave dishonestly by affecting justice sensitivity. We focused our attention 
on unfair experiences because previous studies showed that unfairness has a prominent role in peo-
ple’s evaluations, reactions (van den Bos, Vermunt, &Wilke, 1997), and justice judgments (van den 
Bos, 2009), and may lead to higher level of JS-Victim and JS-Beneficiary than just events (Wijn & 
van den Bos, 2010; Study 1). We nevertheless included both just and unjust events as stimuli to as-
certain whether effects were uniquely related to recalling injustice, or whether they were more gen-
erally elicited by making either unjust or just events salient.  
Since to the best of our knowledge no previous study has yet directly investigated whether 
the JS-Victim and JS-Others are differently activated by situational factors, such as recalling past 
unfair (vs. fair and neutral) treatments at school, and whether theses two different facets of JS may 
be associated with the willingness to behave (dis)honestly, we advanced two competing hypotheses. 
On the one hand, research has shown that recalling an episode involving unfair treatment can in-
crease feelings of entitlement and elicit a focus on selfish goals and outcomes (Ziteck, Jordan, Mon-
in, & Leach, 2010). If so, then the recall of episodes involving unfair treatment may be expected to 
activate the more self-oriented component of justice sensitivity (i.e., JS-Victim). Thus, we could ex-
pect that the recall of past events where individuals received unfair treatment—compared to the re-
call of fair and neutral episodes—would increase individuals’ JS-Victim (H1). As a consequence of 
the activation of JS-Victim, we could expect that people may be driven to behave more dishonestly 
than in control conditions (H1a), since the opportunity to behave dishonestly may be perceived as a 
good strategy to balance unjust experiences and restore feelings of equity. This latter mechanism 
could be understood in the light of equity theory (Adams, 1965) that explains what people feel and 
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react when they assess a situation as unfair. Specifically, this theory suggests that when individuals 
compare the ratio of their inputs and outcomes with the ratio of inputs and outcomes of other indi-
viduals and judge this ratio as unequal, they experience emotional distress. To reduce this distress 
people can act in several negative ways such as poor work performance (Greenberg, 1988), absen-
teeism (Schwarzald, Koslowsy, & Shalit, 1992), and theft (Greenberg, 1993). 
At the same time, research has shown that recalling past negative events that happened to 
the (individual or group) self can be accompanied by reappraisals that have positive effects on indi-
vidual wellbeing, such as reduction of anxiety (Pennebaker, 1997). These re-appraisals can presum-
ably diminish the need for an egoistic and self-focused justice concern, and direct individuals to a 
heightened moral obligation to help others (Warner, Wohl, & Branscombe, 2014; Experiment 1 and 
3). Staub (2003; 2005) named this psychological process as ‘altruism born of suffering.’ Interesting-
ly, research has shown that past adversity was associated with a feeling of compassion for others in 
need (Lim & DeSteno, 2016) and prosocial attitudes towards victims of natural disasters (Vollhardt 
& Staub, 2011). Based on this evidence, an intriguing competing hypothesis could be advanced. 
The re-appraisal of personal unjust experiences could increase the tendency to adopt the perspective 
of others as well as feeling a sense of responsibility for their welfare, thus activating the dimension 
of justice sensitivity closely connected to the other-related concerns i.e., JS-Others (H2). Moreover, 
we could expect that the increase of this perspective of justice sensitivity may lead to a lower will-
ingness to behave dishonestly relative to control conditions (H2a). Although we did feel we had not 
sufficient ground to draw firm hypotheses regarding the pattern to be expected for a ‘justice’ condi-
tion, we added this condition to test whether or not it is sufficient to prime the global concept of jus-
tice (through cues to justice or injustice) to affect justice concerns and (dis)honest behavior, or 
whether this only happens when injustice is primed. 
To test our hypotheses, and in order to maximize the ecological validity of our study, a sam-
ple of adolescents was recruited at their high school, during regular school hours, and asked to re-
call real classroom events in which they felt they had been treated unfairly (vs. fairly vs. neutral).  
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Method 
Design and Participants  
A between participant research design was adopted based on a 3 (type of the recalled epi-
sode: unfair vs. fair vs. neutral) X 2 (source of the described episode: classmates vs. teachers) ex-
perimental design. We decided to vary the source of the described episode in an exploratory vein, to 
ascertain whether it makes difference in participants’ perception.  
An a priori power analysis was conducted for sample size estimation (using GPower 3.1; 
Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). With an alpha = .05 and power = .90, the projected sam-
ple size needed to detect a medium effect size (f = .25, Cohen, 1988) is approximately N = 338 for a 
between-groups comparison (one-way ANOVA with 6 groups; main effects and interactions). We 
recruited a slightly larger sample in order to deal with possible missing data. A total of 433 students 
from a secondary high school in a small town in the center of Italy were involved and randomly as-
signed to conditions (see Table 1). From the total of 433 questionnaires, 64 were excluded (15 ex-
cluded from the unfair condition; 27 from the fair condition and 22 from the neutral condition) be-
cause the respondents completed less than half of the questions (retained sample: 369). Of the re-
tained participants (52% males), 25% of adolescents attended the first year of high school (9th grade 
in the Italian school system), 23% the second, 12% the third, 15% the fourth and 25% the fifth. Age 
ranged from 14 to 20 years (Mage = 16.64, SD = 1.78), with a predominance of 15 (16.5%), 16 
(19.5%), and 18 year-olds (16%).  
After obtaining formal approval from both the Ethical Committee of the University of Peru-
gia and the school headmaster, two undergraduate psychology students collected data in 19 classes 
during school hours and in the presence of a teacher. Participants were involved in a larger data col-
lection effort that included the present study together with other studies on different topics. The 
overall procedure, which consisted in the completion of questionnaires, required approximately 50 
minutes to be completed. Participants’ anonymity was guaranteed and none of the students declined 
to fill in the questionnaire. The study was presented as aiming to investigate some of their experi-
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ences and relationships with classmates, teachers, and strangers. Once the questionnaire was com-
pleted, participants were thanked and verbally debriefed. 
Materials and Procedure  
All questionnaires had the same headings and questions, except for the manipulation section 
that varied according to condition.  
Manipulation. We adapted the procedure used by Horan, Chory, and Goodboy (2010) and 
asked participants to describe in writing an episode during which classmates or teachers (according 
to the source condition) did something to them that they considered unfair vs. fair (according to the 
type of episode condition). In the control condition they were asked to describe a typical school 
day. After data collection, two of the authors of the present paper carefully read all the episodes de-
scribed by participants in order to identify any mistakes in the description of the episode due to a 
possible misunderstanding of the instructions. From this preliminary screening, it emerged that all 
the participants correctly remembered the requested episode in line with the instructions received 
about the type of the episode and the source. 
Manipulation check. After the recall of the episodes, we asked participants to indicate the 
extent to which they regarded the described episode as unfair (one item: “In your opinion, to what 
extent was the episode you recalled unfair?”) and the extent to which they regarded it as fair (In 
your opinion, to what extent was the episode you recalled fair?”) on 10-point rating scales, in which 
higher scores respectively indicate greater unfairness or fairness; from 1 = not at all to 10 = very 
much. 
Dependent variables. Right after completing the manipulation check, participants complet-
ed the Justice Sensitivity Short Scale (Baumert et al., 2014), which comprises 8 items, two from JS-
Victim perspective (e.g., It makes me angry when others are undeservingly better off than me; r = 
.37, p < .001), hereafter called JS-Victim, and 6 from the JS-Others perspective that corresponds to 
the sum of the two items taking the observer perspective (e.g., I am upset when someone is unde-
servingly worse off than others), two items from beneficiary perspective (e.g., I feel guilty when I 
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am better off than others for no reason), and two items from perpetrator perspective (e.g., I feel 
guilty when I enrich myself at the cost of others) (α = .71). As in Baumert et al. (2014) and Schmitt 
et al. (2010), the Justice Sensitivity Short Scale was introduced by short instructions: “People react 
quite differently in unfair situations. How about you? First, we will look at situations to the ad-
vantage of others and to your own disadvantage” (This instruction is inserted to emphasize the vic-
tim perspective), “Now, we will look at situations in which you notice or learn that someone else is 
being treated unfairly, put a disadvantage, or used” (This instruction is inserted to emphasize the 
observer perspective), “Now we will look at situations that turn out to your advantage and to the 
disadvantage of others” (This instruction is inserted to emphasize the beneficiary perspective), “Fi-
nally, we will look at situations in which you treat someone else unfairly, discriminate against 
someone, or exploit someone (This instruction is inserted to emphasize the perpetrator perspective).  
Response options ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 6 (totally agree). We calculated two different 
indices of justice sensitivity—JS-Victim and JS-Others—by averaging the items meant to tap into 
these two dimensions.  
After completing the Justice Sensitivity Short Scale, all participants were presented with six 
fictitious scenarios to measure willingness to behave dishonestly. Each scenario described a 
situation in which they would have the opportunity to steal classmates’ (two scenarios), teachers’ 
(two scenarios), or strangers’ (two scenarios) money or objects (see Appendix). To ensure that, 
when answering these questions, participants were not thinking of the person who treated them 
fairly/unfairly in the event recalled as part of the manipulation, participants read the following 
instructions: “In the next section we ask you to imagine some hypothetical situations. After reading 
the scenario, please answer the questions. Remember, each time we mention “classmates” (or 
“teachers”), please think of individuals who are NOT the same you described in the episode that 
you previously recalled.”  
For each scenario, we asked participants to rate their willingness to act dishonestly on a 7-
point response scale, with higher scores indicating greater willingness to act dishonestly (e.g. “To 
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what extent, would you be willing to…take coins from the wallets of your classmate without saying 
anything?)” Response options ranged from 1 = not at all to 7 = absolutely). We averaged responses 
to the six items to compute a global index of willingness to act dishonestly (α = .71).  
Socio-demographic information. Age, sex, and the class students attended were indicated 
in the last section of the questionnaire.   
The questionnaire was previously piloted with a focus group of 11 adolescents with similar 
socio-demographic characteristics to the final sample of students (7 males and 4 females from 15 to 
17 years old, Mage = 16.00, SD = 0.89). Three out of the 6 originally formulated school scenarios 
and the questions related to their availability to behave dishonestly were modified according to 
participants’ concerns with regard to unclear formulation, or perceived distance from their daily 
experiences. The wording reported here is the final wording used in this study. 
Results 
Manipulation Check of Perceived (Un)fairness 
To check the perceived (un)fairness of the episodes recalled, we conducted two different 
one-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs). The first ANOVA with perceived unfairness of the 
episodes as dependent variable showed that our manipulation was successful, F(2, 353) = 88.04, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .33. Post-hoc test with Bonferroni corrections showed that the episodes recalled in the 
unjust condition were perceived as more unfair (M = 8.00, SD = 2.47) than the episodes recalled in 
the just (M = 2.42, SD = 3.65; p < .001) and the neutral (M = 3.84, SD = 3.67; p < .001) conditions. 
The second ANOVA we conducted with perceived fairness as dependent variable also showed that 
our manipulation was successful, F(2, 337) = 133.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .44. Unjust episodes were 
perceived as less fair (M = 1.03, SD = 2.06) as compared to the just (M = 7.54, SD = 3.18,  p < .001) 
and the neutral episodes (M = 5.04, SD = 3.42, p < .001). 
JS-Victim and JS-Others 
 Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations and correlations among the key study 
variables. To analyze the effect of the type of recalled episode (unfair vs. fair vs. neutral) and the 
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source of the recalled episode (teachers vs. students) on JS-Victim and JS-Others, we conducted a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). A significant multivariate effect emerged for the two 
variables as a group in relation to the type of the episode (p = .018, np2=.02). Neither the source of 
the episode (p = .215) nor the interaction between the two factors (p = .640) reached statistical 
significance at the multivariate level.  
 With regard to univariate effects, in contrast with H1, JS-Victim did not change according to 
the type of episode recalled, F(2,343) = 1.42, p = .243, the source of the episode, F(1,343) = .04, p 
= .846, or their interaction, F(2,343) = .81, p = .448. In line with H2, instead, results showed a 
significant main effect of the type of the episodes on JS-Others, F(2,343) = 5.52, p = .004, np2=.03, 
with higher levels of JS-Others when the type of the episode was unjust (M = 2.98 , SD = .10) 
rather than just (M = 2.60, SD = 1.21, p = .013),  or neutral (M = 2.48, SD = 1.11, p = .001),  while 
neither the source of the episodes F(1,343) = 2.67, p = .103, nor the two-way interaction between 
this source and the type  of the episodes, F(2,343) = .297, p = .744 showed significant effects on 
this variable.  
Willingness to behave dishonestly 
 We conducted an analysis of variancei (ANOVA) to examine the effect of the type (unfair vs. 
fair vs. neutral) and source of the episodes (teacher vs. students) on willingness to act dishonestly. 
Results yielded a significant main effect of the type of the episodes, F(2,363) = 3.25, p = .040, ηp2 = 
.18. When participants recalled unjust episodes, they declared to be less willing to act dishonestly 
(M = 2.70, SD = 1.31) compared to when they recalled a just episode (M = 3.06, SD = 1.50, p = 
.013). No significant differences emerged between the recalling of unjust and neutral episodes, p = 
.060, as well as between the just and neutral episodes, p = .441.  Moreover, the analysis showed that 
neither the main effect of the source of the episodes, F(1,363) = .78, p = .377, nor the interaction 
between this latter variable and the type of the episode recalled, F(2,363) = 1.10, p = .335, had 
significant effects on this variable.  
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Mediational Models 
To test the hypothesized mediational models, we followed the procedure described by 
Preacher and Hayes (2008) through the PROCESS macro, model 4 (Hayes & Preacher, 2014). Fig-
ure 1 depicts the model we tested: Recalling of an unfair episode (vs fair vs. neutral) was modelled 
as the predictor, participants’ willingness to behave dishonestly as the dependent variable, and the 
different facets of justice sensitivity – that is, JS-Victim and JS-Others – were considered as parallel 
mediatorsii. Since the source of the episodes did not affect any of our dependent measures, this vari-
able was not included in the final model.iii  
 Given that our predictor (i.e., type of recalled episode) was a categorical variable with three 
levels, we created two dummy variables with the neutral episode condition as the reference group. 
Contrast 1, hereafter called U-NF (i.e., Unfair vs Neutral and Fair episodes), tested the effect of 
neutral (coded 0) versus unfair (coded 1) episode condition, with fair episode condition coded 0. 
Contrast 2, hereafter called F-NU (i.e., Fair vs Neutral and Unfair episodes), tested the effect of the 
recall of neutral (coded 0) versus fair (coded 1) episode condition, with the unfair episode condition 
coded 0. U-NF was included in the model as independent variable (IV), the overall willingness to 
act unethically as dependent variable (DV), JS-Others and JS-Victim as parallel mediators and the 
F-NU as covariate.  
Through the regression approach, we ascertained the direct link between U-NF and the two 
facets of justice sensitivity, as well as the relationship between JS-Victim, JS-Others and willing-
ness to undertake dishonest behaviors.  
Specifically, the results revealed that the path linking U-NF and JS-Victim (b= .25, SE = .19, 
p = .17), as well as the relationship between this latter facet of justice sensitivity and willingness to 
act dishonestly (b= .06, SE = .05, p = .25) were not statistically significant. 
By contrast, the relationship between the U-NF and JS-Others (b = .50, SE = .14, p < .001) 
was significant, with the positive sign of the regression coefficient indicating that other-related jus-
tice sensitivity increased following the recall of unfair episodes (compared to a control and fair 
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condition). The same result was found with regard to the relationship between JS-Others and will-
ingness to behave dishonestly (b= -.39, SE = .07, p < .001), with higher other-related justice sensi-
tivity associated with a reduced willingness to behave dishonestly. The overall equation was signif-
icant, R2 = .10, F(4,344) = 9.53, p < .001. 
 Then, we followed the procedure described by Hayes (2013) for estimating indirect effects, 
and check whether the reduction in the direct effect may be attributed to our proposed mediator. We 
used bootstrapping with 10,000 resamples to compute 95% confidence intervals using model in-
cluding JS-Victim and JS-Others as mediators. Confidence intervals that do not include 0 denote 
statistically significant indirect effects.  
In contrast with H1a, the results show that the direct effect of U-NF on willingness to act 
dishonestly was not significant (b = -.08, SE = .17, p = .65, 95%CI: LL = -.4195; UL = .2610). The 
indirect effect of U-NF on willingness to behave dishonestly through JS-Victim was also not signif-
icant (b = .02, SE = .02, 95%CI: LL = -. 0067; UL = .0752). By contrast, as we expected (H2a), the 
dimension of JS-Others significantly mediated the relationship between the recall of an unfair epi-
sode and willingness to behave dishonestly (b = -.20, SE = .07, 95%CI: LL = -.3508; UL = -.0852).  
In addition, the variable F-NU, included as a covariate, was not significantly associated nei-
ther with the two perspectives of justice sensitivity used in the model (JS-Victim: b = .21, SE = .19, 
p = .27; JS-Others: b = .12, SE = .15, p = .41) nor with the willingness to behave dishonestly (b = 
.11, SE = .17, p = .52). 
Discussion 
Several studies have shown the importance of individual sensitivity to justice in affecting 
how individuals respond when experiencing unjust events (Baumert et al., 2012; Schmitt et al., 
1995). Even though prior research has focused on justice sensitivity as a relatively stable individual 
trait, recent research has suggested that justice sensitivity can be malleable and triggered by justice-
related experiences (Kastenmüller et al. 2013; Wijn & van den Bos, 2010). Nevertheless, prior to 
the study reported in this paper, no study had examined which component of justice sensitivity is 
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triggered after recalling unfair personal experiences, nor how this might be associated with an 
individual’s willingness to behave dishonestly. Our study showed the plasticity of justice 
sensitivity, supporting our prediction that recalling events in which one was treated unfairly, 
compared to fair or neutral episodes, leads to an increase in justice sensitivity, which in turn 
decreases willingness to behave dishonestly (such as theft of classmates’, teachers’, or strangers’ 
money or objects). Moreover, our findings demonstrated that other-related justice sensitivity (i.e., 
JS-Others, but not self-related justice concerns (i.e., JS-Victim) mediated the effect of the recall of 
episodes involving unfair treatment of the self on willingness to behave dishonestly.   
Thus, our results suggest that being the target of unfair experiences does not necessarily 
activate an egocentric concern for justice for the self, nor does it necessarily motivate dishonest 
behaviors driven by self-interest. Recalling unfair personal experiences can, instead, increase 
concern for others and thereby decrease willingness to behave dishonestly. Moreover, our findings 
suggest that during adolescence JS-Others might act as a protective factor against dishonest 
behaviors and points to possible interventions that involve reappraising past experiences with 
unfairness and redirecting feelings of injustice towards the self to promote a sense of justice for 
others.  
As mentioned above, the present study investigated the relation between experiences with 
(un)fairness, justice sensitivity, and willingness to behave dishonestly in an adolescent sample. 
Despite its originality, our study presents some limitations that need to be amended in future 
studies. Although our research prompted participants to focus on real past events that involved fair 
or unfair treatment, the study was retrospective and did not involve exposing participants to 
ongoing events. These results therefore do not speak directly to how adolescents might react to an 
event as a function of its unfairness, as they do on how they respond once reminded of such events.  
Future studies might complement this research by directly exposing participants to unfair (vs. fair) 
episodes, as well as by assessing behavioral responses to this experience.  
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A point that is worth noting is the fact that we adopted a global self-report scale of 
sensitivity to injustice to assess participants’ reactions to (the recalling of) unfair events. Although 
this could arguably be expected to be less sensitive to situational changes, our findings showed that 
participants’ actually react in the way we hypothesized. Nevertheless, future studies might rely on 
different measures that are more sensitive to state-changes and tap onto a wider range of affective, 
cognitive, and behavioral temporary reactions.  
 A further point that needs to be considered is the adoption of self-report measures to 
estimate dishonest behavior. Even if these measures have frequently been used with adolescents, the 
results we obtained could be influenced by social desirability. It is however worth pointing out that 
it is hard to conceive that participants would have been aware of the ‘desired’ pattern of results, 
especially with regard to the distinct role played by the different components of justice sensitivity. 
In any case, future studies should try to improve the measurement of the dependent variables, 
measuring actual behavior rather than behavioral intentions, as we did. 
Justice-related experiences constantly permeate daily-life, and the school context represents 
one of the most pervasive environments during adolescence. In this context, students constantly 
face experiences that may help them to develop more differentiated conceptions of justice 
(Thorkildsen, 1989). Our results confirm that moral action is an indicator of the extent to which one 
values others in their surrounding (Aquino & Reed, 2002), since focus on injustices that happened 
to the self or to others increases concern for others and decreases willingness to behave dishonestly 
decreases. 
In line with these considerations, we believe that our findings could be important for 
designing and implementing school interventions aimed to promote critical thinking and discussion 
about injustice among adolescents, and give them the opportunity to take responsibility for acting in 
a fair way even when the context in which they live is characterized by unjust events. In order to 
guarantee the effectiveness of the school programs, trainings teachers with a special emphasis on 
justice is essential. Teachers may design interventions that promote reflections on justice and 
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ethical values and, at the same time, support their students to identify strategies to restore justice in 
the classroom and outside of it (Prestch et al., 2016). Although unjust experiences may have 
negative effects on people's lives, school interventions in which students are encouraged to 
remember and share unfair episodes - experienced personally – could have positive consequences, 
such as deciding to act honestly towards others and “do unto others as you would have them do unto 
you.”  
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Appendix 
First scenario  
Yesterday morning your teacher called you to the chair because he/she wanted to ask you questions. 
While he/she thumbed through his/her personal agenda, you were able to see and memorize the 
password required for entry into the school’s electronic registry, where school grades are recorded. 
When you got home you tried to insert the teacher’s password into the registry on the school's web-
site and you manage to login to the electronic register. 
Second scenario 
Yesterday afternoon you met one of your professors in front of the coffee machine. He/she asked 
you for change because he/she did not have any coins. You checked your wallet and saw that you 
had enough change. Once you walked away, you realized that you had made a mistake; you had not 
given him/her enough change and he had not noticed.  
Third scenario  
During physical education hour you get very thirsty. You go in the locker room and look in your 
wallet for coins so that you can buy a bottle of water from the vending machine in the hallway. Un-
fortunately you do not have enough coins, but you realize that your classmate’s wallet is on the 
bench next to you.  
Fourth scenario  
Tomorrow you will have a very important task at school but you still did not buy the necessary ma-
terials. At the end of the school day, you and your classmates hurriedly exit the classroom. You re-
alize that you forgot your umbrella in the classroom and you go back. On the teacher’s chair, you 
note a folder that belongs to your classmate. You approach the folder and inside you find the pre-
cise materials that you will need for the task. 
Fifth scenario  
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After you having shopped for a picnic lunch planned for the weekend, you go to the checkout of the 
supermarket. You pay but the checkout assistant gives you the wrong change. He/she gives you 
more banknotes than he should have. 
Sixth scenario 
You are traveling by train. The passenger next to you gets up because he/she has arrived at his des-
tination. After a few minutes, you notice a small case on the seat where he had been sitting. On the 
case there is a small nameplate containing an address and a phone number. You open the case and 
you find a new and super equipped digital camera.  
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Figure 1  
The effect of the recalled episodes on the willingness to behave dishonestly and the role of JS-Victim and JS-Others as potential mediator (PROCESS, 
Model Number 4) 
 
 
 
 
JS-Victim 
JS-Others 
U-NF a Willingness to behave dishonestly 
.25 
[C.I.: -.1121; .6212] 
.50*** 
[C.I.: .2250; .7831] 
.06 
[C.I.: -.0407; .1590] 
-.39*** 
[C.I.: -.5201; -.2577] 
Direct Effect: b = -.08 (95%CI = -.4195 to .2610) 
Total Indirect Effect: b = -.18 (95%CI = -.3322 to -.0687) 
Total Effect: b = -.26 (95%CI = -.6095 to .0891) 
 
Control for: F-NU b 
a U-NF is coded: 0 = neutral episodes vs. 1 =  unfair episodes – 0 = fair  episodes 
b F-NU is coded: 0 = neutral episodes vs. 1 =  fair episodes – 0 = unfair  episodes 
c Source of the episodes is coded: 1 = classmates and 2 = teachers 
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Table 1 
Number of participants by conditions 
 
 
 Source of the episodes  
Type of the episodes Students Teachers Total 
Unfair  92 28 120 
Fair  55 55 110 
Neutral  81 58 139 
Total 228 141 369 
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Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations and Bivariate Correlations Among Key Study Variables.  
 
  Descriptives Correlations 
Variables Type of the episodes M DS 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Unfairness perception of the episodes 
Unjust 7.87(8.36) 2.64(1.83) -.374*** (-.258) -.042 (.048) -.037 (-.061) -.028 (-.312) 
Just 1.88(2.96) 3.52(3.72) -.730*** (-.350*) -.056 (-.100) -.082 (-.109) .178 (008) 
Neutral 4.03(3.58) 3.80(3.49) -.405*** (-.394**) .091 (.026) -.082 (-.126) -.031 (-.112) 
2. Fairness perception of the episodes 
Unjust 1.02(1.04) 2.08(2.01) - .132 (.363) .158 (-.183) -.082 (412*) 
Just 7.27(7.80) 3.65(2.63) - -.030 (-.100) .112 (.029) -.171 (-.035) 
Neutral 4.82(5.35) 3.54(3.23) - -.065 (.041) -.023 (.061) .028 (003) 
 
3. JS-Victim 
Unjust 2.92(3.14) 1.35(1.49) - - .141 (.342) .166 (-.023) 
Just 3.06(2.66) 1.50(1.50) - - .422** (.459**) -.066 (-.266) 
Neutral 2.77(2.67) 1.60(1.28) - - .062 (.368**) -.039 (.080) 
 
4. JS-Others 
Unjust 2.96(3.08) .98(1.10) - - - -.169 (-.441*) 
Just 2.52(2.68) 1.14(1.29) - - - -.175 (-.472**) 
Neutral 2.33(2.67) 1.08(1.12) - - - -.434*** (-.124) 
 Unjust 2.80(2.34) 1.37(1.03) - - - - 
5. Willingness to behave dishonestly Just 3.00(3.13) 1.28(1.69) - - - - 
 Neutral 2.97(2.90) 1.38(1.34) - - - - 
Notes 
* p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
Values outside the brackets referred to the level “students” of the experimental condition called “source of the episodes” while values within the brackets referred to 
the level “teachers”.  
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i Since having recruited participants within their classes could raise concerns about the non-independence in the data structure, we performed a series 
of mixed method analyses of variance, in which, for each dependent variable, we compared the models with fixed effects only (i.e., those used in the 
analyses reported in the remainder of this work and retained as the reference model) with a) model including the random intercept effect across classes, 
and b) a model including both random intercept and random slope effects. Results revealed than in no case random effects turned out to be significant, 
thus meaning that neither mean levels of the VDs nor the size of the observed effects of the VI significantly varied across classes. More importantly, 
classroom-level factors accounted for a very small portion of the error variability, and in no case the fit of the models (as measured by the AIC index) 
improved when random effects were included in the analyses. The pattern of fixed effects remained unchanged across all the analyses. 
 
ii We further tested two distinct models with JS-Victim and JS-Others as unique mediators, and results did not change. 
iii Research findings did not change with the inclusion of the source of the episodes as a moderator between the type of episodes and the willingness to 
behave dishonestly.  
